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The most familiar example of path dependence is the triumph of Matsushita's VHS standard for videocassette recorders over Sony's Betamax. Betamax was first and, by most accounts, better. But Sony made two strategic marketing errors. To get the product out the door faster, it initially sold Betamax machines that played one-hour tapes -- too short for an entire movie. And to sell more Sony machines, the company chose not to license Betamax to competitors.
VHS, introduced a year later, in 1976, played two-hour tapes. And since Matsushita freely licensed the technology, half a dozen other brand-name VHS players hit the stores in a matter of months. Sony soon countered with a two-hour machine, but it was too late.
While VHS versus Betamax makes great fodder for business school seminars, the outcome hardly made the earth move. The stakes have been much higher in technologies that are now so entrenched it's hard to imagine the world without them. Take the automobile engine. At the turn of the century, gasoline was locked in a three-way race with steam and electric power. The Stanley Steamer was a technological marvel, setting a world speed record of 122 miles an hour in 1909. But the manufacturer priced the car as a luxury, never trying to achieve the economies of mass production and of "learning by doing" that might have made it the people's car.
Moreover, steam's economic problems were compounded by an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease in 1914 that briefly closed public horse troughs and denied steam cars a convenient source of water for their perpetually thirsty boilers. With better technology or simply many more steam cars on the road, this liability would have evaporated. But car buyers had little incentive to make a leap of faith when plausible alternatives were available. One of those alternatives was the electric car, whose weakness was a driving range limited by the storage capacity of its batteries. That problem seemed well on its way to solution around 1915. But innovators in the battery industry were distracted by the more immediate need to perfect a high-amperage battery to crank the new electric starters in cars with gasoline engines.
Apparently all the gasoline engine needed to triumph was a brief period in which its technological and price edge led to rapidly expanding sales. This cut production costs, which expanded sales even more -- and made it more convenient to fuel and service gasoline vehicles.
Today, of course, dependence on gasoline engines is a fact of life. While electric or steam vehicles would reduce air pollution and dependence on imported oil, it would take an investment of tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars to leap the technological chasm. Indeed, California, which has mandated the use of electric cars, is just now facing the reality that the existing technology is wretchedly inadequate to the task.
Robin Cowan of the University of Western Ontario offers a second cautionary tale of path dependence. The world is stuck with another functional, but environmentally problematic, technology: the "light water" nuclear reactor, whose momentary superiority over reactors that use inert gases led to the virtual abandonment of alternatives.
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In the mid-1950's there was no particular reason to believe that light-water reactors were the cheapest to build and operate. But the Navy invested heavily in light water, which was seen as the most compact and reliable design for submarines and aircraft carriers. When Washington pressed for a quick scale-up to commercial nuclear power after the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear weapon, American manufacturers took the route of least technological resistance.
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Later, Washington used subsidies for design and manufacturing to persuade the Europeans to switch to a light-water standard. And once light-water reactors were produced in quantity, the manufacturers learned-by-doing, cutting costs well below those of competing designs.
Perhaps light-water reactors would have prevailed in any event. But there is little doubt that a competing gas-graphite system was safer because it offered greater protection against catastrophic loss of coolant. With global warming now looming, the "lock-in" to atmospherically benign -- but widely feared -- light-water nuclear technology must count as an opportunity lost.
If path dependence is such a big deal, why are college freshmen unlikely to encounter the idea in Econ. 101? Brian Arthur, a pioneer in the field at Stanford in the early 1980's who now does research at the Santa Fe Institute, blames tradition-bound economists. Put it another way: the "technology" of modern economics is itself path dependent, because economists have so much invested elsewhere.
More important, free marketeers fear that path dependence will become a rationale for bigger government -- and is thus the Devil's work. If competitive markets do not guarantee that the best technologies survive, the thinking goes, surely sometime-liberals like Bill Clinton will be more tempted to try to pick winners.
The twist here is that the perspective of path dependence offers no succor to industrial-policy enthusiasts. It was Washington, after all, that locked in light-water nuclear reactor technology. And it was Tokyo that cursed its manufacturers with a high-definition television that was obsolete before the first receiver was sold.
But a world haunted by path dependence does cry out for a different sort of intervention. Government as the referee who makes everyone play by the same impartial rules is not quite enough.
The first goal is to get government to slow down and think twice before setting hard-to-reverse technological standards. The Federal Communications Commission was criticized for dragging its feet on setting standards for the new high-definition television. Because it dawdled, however, digital technology had a chance to prove itself before the F.C.C. got around to writing the final rules. But the lesson also applies to cases that everyone would rather forget, like Washington's premature decision to back recyclable space shuttles over throwaway rocket launchers.
The more controversial issue is antitrust -- think Microsoft. It often pays an individual company to set a standard by flexing its own marketing muscle long before a clear winner has emerged. And the risks of path dependence suggest that Washington would do well to slow such private standard-setting until competitors had a chance to strut their stuff.
The Government will no doubt be called on to take a stand on some looming path-dependence battles: all-purpose personal computers versus cheaper, appliance-like "network computers" that do one thing well; wireless personal communications versus high-capacity cable; Internet software built around Netscape's browser versus software that piggy-backs on the Microsoft Network.
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Would Adam Smith approve of venturing where the invisible hand doesn't have a clue? Perhaps not. But then the old guy never had to worry about Microsoft's clumsy software chewing up a chapter of "The Wealth of Nations."