566 lines
32 KiB
Markdown
566 lines
32 KiB
Markdown
---
|
||
created_at: '2017-01-04T04:44:15.000Z'
|
||
title: Why anything? Why this? (1998)
|
||
url: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v20/n02/derek-parfit/why-anything-why-this
|
||
author: diodorus
|
||
points: 66
|
||
story_text:
|
||
comment_text:
|
||
num_comments: 77
|
||
story_id:
|
||
story_title:
|
||
story_url:
|
||
parent_id:
|
||
created_at_i: 1483505055
|
||
_tags:
|
||
- story
|
||
- author_diodorus
|
||
- story_13315746
|
||
objectID: '13315746'
|
||
year: 1998
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
Why does the Universe exist? There are two questions here. First, why is
|
||
there a Universe at all? It might have been true that nothing ever
|
||
existed: no living beings, no stars, no atoms, not even space or time.
|
||
When we think about this possibility, it can seem astonishing that
|
||
anything exists. Second, why does this Universe exist? Things might have
|
||
been, in countless ways, different. So why is the Universe as it is?
|
||
|
||
These questions, some believe, may have causal answers. Suppose first
|
||
that the Universe has always existed. Some believe that, if all events
|
||
were caused by earlier events, everything would be explained. That,
|
||
however, is not so. Even an infinite series of events cannot explain
|
||
itself. We could ask why this series occurred, rather than some other
|
||
series, or no series. Of the supporters of the Steady State Theory, some
|
||
welcomed what they took to be this theory’s atheistic implications. They
|
||
assumed that, if the Universe had no beginning, there would be nothing
|
||
for a Creator to explain. But there would still be an eternal Universe
|
||
to explain.
|
||
|
||
Suppose next that the Universe is not eternal, since nothing preceded
|
||
the Big Bang. That first event, some physicists suggest, may have obeyed
|
||
the laws of quantum mechanics, by being a random fluctuation in a
|
||
vacuum. This would causally explain, they say, how the Universe came
|
||
into existence out of nothing. But what physicists call a vacuum isn’t
|
||
really nothing. We can ask why it exists, and has the potentialities it
|
||
does. In Hawking’s phrase, ‘What breathes fire into the equations?’
|
||
|
||
Similar remarks apply to all suggestions of these kinds. There could not
|
||
be a causal explanation of why the Universe exists, why there are any
|
||
laws of nature, or why these laws are as they are. Nor would it make a
|
||
difference if there is a God, who caused the rest of the Universe to
|
||
exist. There could not be a causal explanation of why God exists.
|
||
|
||
Many people have assumed that, since these questions cannot have causal
|
||
answers, they cannot have any answers. Some therefore dismiss these
|
||
questions, thinking them not worth considering. Others conclude that
|
||
they do not make sense. They assume that, as Wittgenstein wrote, ‘doubt
|
||
can exist only where there is a question; and a question only where
|
||
there is an answer.’
|
||
|
||
These assumptions are all, I believe, mistaken. Even if these questions
|
||
could not have answers, they would still make sense, and they would
|
||
still be worth considering. I am reminded here of the aesthetic category
|
||
of the sublime, as applied to the highest mountains, raging oceans, the
|
||
night sky, the interiors of some cathedrals, and other things that are
|
||
superhuman, awesome, limitless. No question is more sublime than why
|
||
there is a Universe: why there is anything rather than nothing. Nor
|
||
should we assume that answers to this question must be causal. And, even
|
||
if reality cannot be fully explained, we may still make progress, since
|
||
what is inexplicable may become less baffling than it now seems.
|
||
|
||
One apparent fact about reality has recently been much discussed. Many
|
||
physicists believe that, for life to be possible, various features of
|
||
the Universe must be almost precisely as they are. As one example, we
|
||
can take the initial conditions in the Big Bang. If these conditions had
|
||
been more than very slightly different, these physicists claim, the
|
||
Universe would not have had the complexity that allows living beings to
|
||
exist. Why were these conditions so precisely
|
||
right?[\[\*\]](#fn-asterisk)
|
||
|
||
Some say: ‘If they had not been right, we couldn’t even ask this
|
||
question.’ But that is no answer. It could be baffling how we survived
|
||
some crash even though, if we hadn’t, we could not be baffled.
|
||
|
||
Others say: ‘There had to be some initial conditions, and the conditions
|
||
that make life possible were as likely as any others. So there is
|
||
nothing to be explained.’ To see what is wrong with this reply, we must
|
||
distinguish two kinds of case. Suppose first that, when some radio
|
||
telescope is aimed at most points in space, it records a random sequence
|
||
of incoming waves. There might be nothing here that needed to be
|
||
explained. Suppose next that, when the telescope is aimed in one
|
||
direction, it records a sequence of waves whose pulses match the number
|
||
π, in binary notation, to the first ten thousand digits. That
|
||
particular number is, in one sense, just as likely as any other. But
|
||
there would be something here that needed to be explained. Though each
|
||
long number is unique, only a very few are, like π, mathematically
|
||
special. What would need to be explained is why this sequence of waves
|
||
exactly matched such a special number. Though this matching might be a
|
||
coincidence, which had been randomly produced, that would be most
|
||
unlikely. We could be almost certain that these waves had been produced
|
||
by some kind of intelligence.
|
||
|
||
On the view that we are now considering, since any sequence of waves is
|
||
as likely as any other, there would be nothing to be explained. If we
|
||
accepted this view, intelligent beings elsewhere in space would not be
|
||
able to communicate with us, since we would ignore their messages. Nor
|
||
could God reveal himself. Suppose that, with an optical telescope, we
|
||
saw a distant pattern of stars which spelled out in Hebrew script the
|
||
first chapter of Genesis. According to this view, this pattern of stars
|
||
would not need to be explained. That is clearly false.
|
||
|
||
Here is another analogy. Suppose first that, of a thousand people facing
|
||
death, only one can be rescued. If there is a lottery to pick this one
|
||
survivor, and I win, I would be very lucky. But there might be nothing
|
||
here that needed to be explained. Someone had to win, and why not me?
|
||
Consider next another lottery. Unless my gaoler picks the longest of a
|
||
thousand straws, I shall be shot. If my gaoler picks that straw, there
|
||
would be something to be explained. It would not be enough to say, ‘This
|
||
result was as likely as any other.’ In the first lottery, nothing
|
||
special happened: whatever the result, someone’s life would be saved. In
|
||
this second lottery, the result was special, since, of the thousand
|
||
possible results, only one would save a life. Why was this special
|
||
result also what happened? Though this might be a coincidence, the
|
||
chance of that is only one in a thousand. I could be almost certain
|
||
that, like Dostoevsky’s mock execution, this lottery was rigged.
|
||
|
||
The Big Bang, it seems, was like this second lottery. For life to be
|
||
possible, the initial conditions had to be selected with great accuracy.
|
||
This appearance of fine-tuning, as some call it, also needs to be
|
||
explained.
|
||
|
||
It may be objected that, in regarding conditions as special if they
|
||
allow for life, we unjustifiably assume our own importance. But life is
|
||
special, if only because of its complexity. An earthworm’s brain is more
|
||
complicated than a lifeless galaxy. Nor is it only life that requires
|
||
this fine-tuning. If the Big Bang’s initial conditions had not been
|
||
almost precisely as they were, the Universe would have either almost
|
||
instantly recollapsed, or expanded so fast, and with particles so thinly
|
||
spread, that not even stars or heavy elements could have formed. That is
|
||
enough to make these conditions very special.
|
||
|
||
It may next be objected that these conditions cannot be claimed to be
|
||
improbable, since such a claim requires a statistical basis, and there
|
||
is only one Universe. If we were considering all conceivable Universes,
|
||
it would indeed be implausible to make judgments of statistical
|
||
probability. But our question is much narrower. We are asking what would
|
||
have happened if, with the same laws of nature, the initial conditions
|
||
had been different. That provides the basis for a statistical judgment.
|
||
There is a range of values that these conditions might have had, and
|
||
physicists can work out in what proportion of this range the resulting
|
||
Universe could have contained stars, heavy elements and life.
|
||
|
||
This proportion, it is claimed, is extremely small. Of the range of
|
||
possible initial conditions, fewer than one in a billion billion would
|
||
have produced a Universe with the complexity that allows for life. If
|
||
this claim is true, as I shall here assume, there is something that
|
||
cries out to be explained. Why was one of this tiny set also the one
|
||
that actually obtained?
|
||
|
||
On one view, this was a mere coincidence. That is conceivable, since
|
||
coincidences happen. But this view is hard to believe, since, if it were
|
||
true, the chance of this coincidence occurring would be below one in a
|
||
billion billion.
|
||
|
||
Others say: ‘The Big Bang was fine-tuned. In creating the Universe, God
|
||
chose to make life possible.’ Atheists may reject this answer, thinking
|
||
it improbable that God exists. But this probability cannot be as low as
|
||
one in a billion billion. So even atheists should admit that, of these
|
||
two answers to our question, the one that invokes God is more likely to
|
||
be true.
|
||
|
||
This reasoning revives one of the traditional arguments for belief in
|
||
God. In its strongest form, this argument appealed to the many features
|
||
of animals, such as eyes or wings, that look as if they have been
|
||
designed. Paley’s appeal to such features much impressed Darwin when he
|
||
was young. Darwin later undermined this form of the argument, since
|
||
evolution can explain this appearance of design. But evolution cannot
|
||
explain the appearance of fine-tuning in the Big Bang.
|
||
|
||
This argument’s appeal to probabilities can be challenged in a different
|
||
way. In claiming it to be most improbable that this fine-tuning was a
|
||
coincidence, the argument assumes that, of the possible initial
|
||
conditions in the Big Bang, each was equally likely to obtain. That
|
||
assumption may be mistaken. The conditions that allow for complexity and
|
||
life may have been, compared with all the others, much more likely to
|
||
obtain. Perhaps they were even certain to obtain.
|
||
|
||
To answer this objection, we must broaden this argument’s conclusion. If
|
||
these life-allowing conditions were either very likely or certain to
|
||
obtain, then – as the argument claims – it would be no coincidence that
|
||
the Universe allows for complexity and life. But this fine-tuning might
|
||
have been the work, not of some existing being, but of some impersonal
|
||
force, or fundamental law. That is what some theists believe God to be.
|
||
|
||
A stronger challenge to this argument comes from a different way of
|
||
explaining the appearance of fine-tuning. Consider first a similar
|
||
question. For life to be possible on Earth, many of Earth’s features
|
||
have to be close to being as they are. The Earth’s having such features,
|
||
it might be claimed, is unlikely to be a coincidence, and should
|
||
therefore be regarded as God’s work. But such an argument would be weak.
|
||
The Universe, we can reasonably believe, contains many planets, with
|
||
varying conditions. We should expect that, on a few of these planets,
|
||
conditions would be just right for life. Nor is it surprising that we
|
||
live on one of these few.
|
||
|
||
Things are different, we may assume, with the appearance of fine-tuning
|
||
in the Big Bang. While there are likely to be many other planets, there
|
||
is only one Universe. But this difference may be less than it seems.
|
||
Some physicists suggest that the observable Universe is only one out of
|
||
many different worlds, which are all equally parts of reality. According
|
||
to one such view, the other worlds are related to ours in a way that
|
||
solves some of the mysteries of quantum physics. On the different and
|
||
simpler view that is relevant here, the other worlds have the same
|
||
fundamental laws of nature as our world, and they are produced by Big
|
||
Bangs that are broadly similar, except in having different initial
|
||
conditions.
|
||
|
||
On this Many Worlds Hypothesis, there is no need for fine-tuning. If
|
||
there were enough Big Bangs, we should expect that, in a few of them,
|
||
conditions would be just right to allow for complexity and life; and it
|
||
would be no surprise that our Big Bang was one of these few. To
|
||
illustrate this point, we can revise my second lottery. Suppose my
|
||
gaoler picks a straw, not once but many times. That would explain his
|
||
managing, once, to pick the longest straw, without that’s being an
|
||
extreme coincidence, or this lottery’s being rigged.
|
||
|
||
On most versions of the Many Worlds Hypothesis, these many worlds are
|
||
not, except through their origins, causally related. Some object that,
|
||
since our world could not be causally affected by such other worlds, we
|
||
can have no evidence for their existence, and can therefore have no
|
||
reason to believe in them. But we do have such a reason, since their
|
||
existence would explain an otherwise puzzling feature of our world: the
|
||
appearance of fine-tuning.
|
||
|
||
Of these two ways to explain this appearance, which is better? Compared
|
||
with belief in God, the Many Worlds Hypothesis is more cautious, since
|
||
its claim is merely that there is more of the kind of reality that we
|
||
can observe around us. But God’s existence has been claimed to be
|
||
intrinsically more probable. According to most theists, God is a being
|
||
who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. The uncaused existence of
|
||
such a being has been claimed to be simpler, and less arbitrary, than
|
||
the uncaused existence of many highly complicated worlds. And simpler
|
||
hypotheses, many scientists assume, are more likely to be true.
|
||
|
||
If such a God exists, however, other features of our world become hard
|
||
to explain. It may not be surprising that God chose to make life
|
||
possible. But the laws of nature could have been different, so there are
|
||
many possible worlds that would have contained life. It is hard to
|
||
understand why, out of all these possibilities, God chose to create our
|
||
world. What is most baffling is the problem of evil. There appears to be
|
||
suffering which any good person, knowing the truth, would have prevented
|
||
if he could. If there is such suffering, there cannot be a God who is
|
||
omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.
|
||
|
||
To this problem, theists have proposed several solutions. Some suggest
|
||
that God is not omnipotent, or not wholly good. Others suggest that
|
||
undeserved suffering is not, as it seems, bad, or that God could not
|
||
prevent such suffering without making the Universe, as a whole, less
|
||
good.
|
||
|
||
We must ignore these suggestions here, since we have larger questions to
|
||
consider. I began by asking why things are as they are. Before returning
|
||
to that question, we should ask how things are. There is much about our
|
||
world that we have not discovered. And, just as there may be other
|
||
worlds that are like ours, there may be worlds that are very different.
|
||
|
||
It will help to distinguish two kinds of possibility. Cosmic
|
||
possibilities cover everything that ever exists, and are the different
|
||
ways that the whole of reality might be. Only one such possibility can
|
||
be actual, or the one that obtains. Local possibilities are the
|
||
different ways that some part of reality, or local world, might be. If
|
||
some local world exists, that leaves it open whether other worlds exist.
|
||
|
||
One cosmic possibility is, roughly, that every possible local world
|
||
exists. This we can call the All Worlds Hypothesis. Another possibility,
|
||
which might have obtained, is that nothing ever exists. This we can call
|
||
the Null Possibility. In each of the remaining possibilities, the number
|
||
of worlds that exist is between none and all. There are countless of
|
||
these possibilities, since there are countless combinations of
|
||
particular possible local worlds.
|
||
|
||
Of these different cosmic possibilities, one must obtain, and only one
|
||
can obtain. So we have two questions: which obtains, and why? These
|
||
questions are connected. If some possibility would be easier to explain,
|
||
we have more reason to believe that this possibility obtains. This is
|
||
how, rather than believing in only one Big Bang, we have more reason to
|
||
believe in many. Whether we believe in one or many, we have the question
|
||
why any Big Bang has occurred. Though this question is hard, the
|
||
occurrence of many Big Bangs is not more puzzling than the occurrence of
|
||
only one. Most kinds of thing, or event, have many instances. We also
|
||
have the question why, in the Big Bang that produced our world, the
|
||
initial conditions allowed for complexity and life. If there has been
|
||
only one Big Bang, this fact is also hard to explain, since it is most
|
||
unlikely that these conditions merely happened to be right. If, instead,
|
||
there have been many Big Bangs, this fact is easy to explain, since it
|
||
is like the fact that, among countless planets, there are some whose
|
||
conditions allow for life. Since belief in many Big Bangs leaves less
|
||
that is unexplained, it is the better view.
|
||
|
||
If some cosmic possibilities would be less puzzling than others, because
|
||
their obtaining would leave less to be explained, is there some
|
||
possibility whose obtaining would be in no way puzzling?
|
||
|
||
Consider first the Null Possibility, in which nothing ever exists. To
|
||
imagine this possibility, it may help to suppose first, that all that
|
||
ever existed was a single atom. We then imagine that even this atom
|
||
never existed.
|
||
|
||
Some have claimed that, if there had never been anything, there wouldn’t
|
||
have been anything to be explained. But that is not so. When we imagine
|
||
how things would have been if nothing had ever existed, what we should
|
||
imagine away are such things as living beings, stars and atoms. There
|
||
would still have been various truths, such as the truth that there were
|
||
no stars or atoms, or that 9 is divisible by 3. We can ask why these
|
||
things would have been true. And such questions may have answers. Thus
|
||
we can explain why, even if nothing had ever existed, 9 would still have
|
||
been divisible by 3. There is no conceivable alternative. And we can
|
||
explain why there would have been no such things as immaterial matter,
|
||
or spherical cubes. Such things are logically impossible. But why would
|
||
nothing have existed? Why would there have been no stars or atoms, no
|
||
philosophers or bluebell woods?
|
||
|
||
We should not claim that, if nothing had ever existed, there would have
|
||
been nothing to be explained. But we can claim something less. Of all
|
||
the global possibilities, the Null Possibility would have needed the
|
||
least explanation. As Leibniz pointed out, it is much the simplest, and
|
||
the least arbitrary. And it is the easiest to understand. It can seem
|
||
mysterious, for example, how things could exist without their existence
|
||
having some cause, but there cannot be a causal explanation of why the
|
||
whole Universe, or God, exists. The Null Possibility raises no such
|
||
problem. If nothing had ever existed, that state of affairs would not
|
||
have needed to be caused.
|
||
|
||
Reality, however, does not take its least puzzling form. In some way or
|
||
other, a Universe has managed to exist. That is what can take one’s
|
||
breath away. As Wittgenstein wrote, ‘not how the world is, is the
|
||
mystical, but that it is.’ Or, in the words of a thinker as unmystical
|
||
as Jack Smart: ‘That anything should exist at all does seem to me a
|
||
matter for the deepest awe.’
|
||
|
||
Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, in which every possible local
|
||
world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this may be how things are.
|
||
And it may be the next least puzzling possibility. This hypothesis is
|
||
not the same as – though it includes – the Many Worlds Hypothesis. On
|
||
that more cautious view, many other worlds have the same elements as our
|
||
world, and the same fundamental laws, and differ only in such features
|
||
as their constants and initial conditions. The All Worlds Hypothesis
|
||
covers every conceivable kind of world, and most of these other worlds
|
||
would have very different elements and laws.
|
||
|
||
If all these worlds exist, we can ask why they do. But, compared with
|
||
most other cosmic possibilities, the All Worlds Hypothesis may leave
|
||
less that is unexplained. For example, whatever the number of possible
|
||
worlds that exist, we have the question, ‘Why that number?’ This
|
||
question would have been least puzzling if the number that existed were
|
||
none, and the next least arbitrary possibility seems to be that all
|
||
these worlds exist. With every other cosmic possibility, we have a
|
||
further question. If ours is the only world, we can ask: ‘Out of all the
|
||
possible worlds, why is this the one that exists?’ On any version of the
|
||
Many Worlds Hypothesis, we have a similar question: ‘Why do just these
|
||
worlds exist, with these elements and laws?’ But, if all these worlds
|
||
exist, there is no such further question.
|
||
|
||
It may be objected that, even if all possible local worlds exist, that
|
||
does not explain why our world is as it is. But that is a mistake. If
|
||
all these worlds exist, each world is as it is in the way in which each
|
||
number is as it is. We cannot sensibly ask why 9 is 9. Nor should we ask
|
||
why our world is the one it is: why it is this world. That would be like
|
||
asking, ‘Why are we who we are?’, or ‘Why is it now the time that it
|
||
is?’ Those are not good questions.
|
||
|
||
Though the All Worlds Hypothesis avoids certain questions, it is not as
|
||
simple, or un-arbitrary, as the Null Possibility. There may be no sharp
|
||
distinction between worlds that are and are not possible. It is unclear
|
||
what counts as a kind of world. And, if there are infinitely many kinds,
|
||
there is a choice between different kinds of infinity.
|
||
|
||
Whichever cosmic possibility obtains, we can ask why it obtains. All
|
||
that I have claimed so far is that, with some possibilities, this
|
||
question would be less puzzling. Let us now ask: could this question
|
||
have an answer? Might there be a theory that leaves nothing unexplained?
|
||
|
||
It is sometimes claimed that God, or the Universe, make themselves
|
||
exist. But this cannot be true, since these entities cannot do anything
|
||
unless they exist.
|
||
|
||
On a more intelligible view, it is logically necessary that God, or the
|
||
Universe, exist, since the claim that they might not have existed leads
|
||
to a contradiction. On such a view, though it may seem conceivable that
|
||
there might never have been anything, that is not really logically
|
||
possible. Some people even claim that there may be only one coherent
|
||
cosmic possibility. Thus Einstein suggested that, if God created our
|
||
world, he might have had no choice about which world to create. If such
|
||
a view were true, everything might be explained. Reality might be the
|
||
way it is because there was no conceivable alternative. But, for reasons
|
||
that have been often given, we can reject such views.
|
||
|
||
Consider next a quite different view. According to Plato, Plotinus and
|
||
others, the Universe exists because its existence is good. Even if we
|
||
are confident that we should reject this view, it is worth asking
|
||
whether it makes sense. If it does, that may suggest other
|
||
possibilities.
|
||
|
||
This Axiarchic View can take a theistic form. It can claim that God
|
||
exists because his existence is good, and that the rest of the Universe
|
||
exists because God caused it to exist. But in that explanation God, qua
|
||
Creator, is redundant. If God can exist because his existence is good,
|
||
so can the whole Universe. This may be why some theists reject the
|
||
Axiarchic View, and insist that God’s existence is a brute fact, with no
|
||
explanation.
|
||
|
||
In its simplest form, this view makes three claims: ‘(1) It would be
|
||
best if reality were a certain way. (2) Reality is that way. (3) (1)
|
||
explains (2).’ (1) is an ordinary evaluative claim, like the claim that
|
||
it would be better if there was less suffering. The Axiarchic View
|
||
assumes, I believe rightly, that such claims can be in a strong sense
|
||
true. (2) is an ordinary empirical or scientific claim, though of a
|
||
sweeping kind. What is distinctive in this view is claim (3), according
|
||
to which (1) explains (2).
|
||
|
||
Can we understand this third claim? To focus on this question, we should
|
||
briefly ignore the world’s evils, and suspend our other doubts about
|
||
claims (1) and (2). We should suppose that, as Leibniz claimed, the best
|
||
possible Universe exists. Would it then make sense to claim that this
|
||
Universe exists because it is the best?
|
||
|
||
That use of ‘because’, Axiarchists should admit, cannot be easily
|
||
explained. But even ordinary causation is mysterious. At the most
|
||
fundamental level, we have no idea why some events cause others; and it
|
||
is hard to explain what causation is. There are, moreover, non-causal
|
||
senses of ‘because’ and ‘why’, as in the claim that God exists because
|
||
his existence is logically necessary. We can understand that claim, even
|
||
if we think it false. The Axiarchic View is harder to understand. But
|
||
that is not surprising. If there is some explanation of the whole of
|
||
reality, we should not expect this explanation to fit neatly into some
|
||
familiar category. This extra-ordinary question may have an
|
||
extra-ordinary answer. We should reject suggested answers which make no
|
||
sense; but we should also try to see what might make sense.
|
||
|
||
Axiarchy might be expressed as follows. We are now supposing that, of
|
||
all the countless ways that the whole of reality might be, one is both
|
||
the very best, and is the way that reality is. On the Axiarchic View,
|
||
that is no coincidence. This claim, I believe, makes sense. And, if it
|
||
were no coincidence that the best way for reality to be is also the way
|
||
that reality is, that might support the further claim that this was why
|
||
reality was this way.
|
||
|
||
This view has one advantage over the more familiar theistic view. An
|
||
appeal to God cannot explain why the Universe exists, since God would
|
||
himself be part of the Universe, or one of the things that exist. Some
|
||
theists argue that, since nothing can exist without a cause, God, who is
|
||
the First Cause, must exist. As Schopenhauer objected, this argument’s
|
||
premise is not like some cabdriver whom theists are free to dismiss once
|
||
they have reached their destination. The Axiarchic View appeals, not to
|
||
an existing entity, but to an explanatory law. Since such a law would
|
||
not itself be part of the Universe, it might explain why the Universe
|
||
exists, and is as good as it could be. If such a law governed reality,
|
||
we could still ask why it did, or why the Axiarchic View was true. But,
|
||
in discovering this law, we would have made some progress.
|
||
|
||
It is hard, however, to believe the Axiarchic View. If, as it seems,
|
||
there is much pointless suffering, our world cannot be part of the best
|
||
possible Universe.
|
||
|
||
Some Axiarchists claim that, if we reject their view, we must regard our
|
||
world’s existence as a brute fact, since no other explanation could make
|
||
sense. But that, I believe, is not so. If we abstract from the optimism
|
||
of the Axiarchic View, its claims are these: ‘Of the countless cosmic
|
||
possibilities, one both has a very special feature, and is the
|
||
possibility that obtains. That is no coincidence. This possibility
|
||
obtains because it has this feature.’ Other views can make such claims.
|
||
This special feature need not be that of being best. Thus, on the All
|
||
Worlds Hypothesis, reality is maximal, or as full as it could be.
|
||
Similarly, if nothing had ever existed, reality would have been minimal,
|
||
or as empty as it could be. If the possibility that obtained were either
|
||
maximal or minimal, that fact, we might claim, would be most unlikely to
|
||
be a coincidence. And that might support the further claim that this
|
||
possibility’s having this feature would be why it obtained.
|
||
|
||
Let us now look more closely at that last step. When it is no
|
||
coincidence that two things are both true, there is something that
|
||
explains why, given the truth of one, the other is also true. The truth
|
||
of either might make the other true. Or both might be explained by some
|
||
third truth, as when two facts are the joint effects of a common cause.
|
||
|
||
Suppose next that, of the cosmic possibilities, one is both very special
|
||
and is the one that obtains. If that is no coincidence, what might
|
||
explain why these things are both true? On the reasoning that we are now
|
||
considering, the first truth explains the second, since this possibility
|
||
obtains because it has this special feature. Given the kind of truths
|
||
these are, such an explanation could not go the other way. This
|
||
possibility could not have this feature because it obtains. If some
|
||
possibility has some feature, it could not fail to have this feature, so
|
||
it would have this feature whether or not it obtains. The All Worlds
|
||
Hypothesis, for example, could not fail to describe the fullest way for
|
||
reality to be.
|
||
|
||
While it is necessary that our imagined possibility has its special
|
||
feature, it is not necessary that this possibility obtains. This
|
||
difference, I believe, justifies the reasoning that we are now
|
||
considering. Since this possibility must have this feature, but might
|
||
not have obtained, it cannot have this feature because it obtains, nor
|
||
could some third truth explain why it both has this feature and obtains.
|
||
So, if these facts are no coincidence, this possibility must obtain
|
||
because it has this feature.
|
||
|
||
When some possibility obtains because it has some feature, its having
|
||
this feature may be why some agent, or process of natural selection,
|
||
made it obtain. These we can call the intentional and evolutionary ways
|
||
in which some feature of some possibility may explain why it obtains.
|
||
|
||
Our world, theists claim, can be explained in the first of these ways.
|
||
If reality were as good as it could be, it would indeed make sense to
|
||
claim that this was partly God’s work. But, since God’s own existence
|
||
could not be God’s work, there could be no intentional explanation of
|
||
why the whole of reality was as good as it could be. So we could
|
||
reasonably conclude that this way’s being the best explained directly
|
||
why reality was this way. Even if God exists, the intentional
|
||
explanation could not compete with the different and bolder explanation
|
||
offered by the Axiarchic View.
|
||
|
||
Return now to other explanations of this kind. Consider first the Null
|
||
Possibility. This, we know, does not obtain; but, since we are asking
|
||
what makes sense, that does not matter. If there had never been
|
||
anything, would that have had to be a brute fact, which had no
|
||
explanation? The answer, I suggest, is No. It might have been no
|
||
coincidence that, of all the countless cosmic possibilities, what
|
||
obtained was the simplest, and least arbitrary, and the only possibility
|
||
in which nothing ever exists. And, if these facts had been no
|
||
coincidence, this possibility would have obtained because – or partly
|
||
because – it had one or more of these special features. This
|
||
explanation, moreover, could not have taken an intentional or
|
||
evolutionary form. If nothing had ever existed, there could not have
|
||
been some agent, or process of selection, who or which made this
|
||
possibility obtain. Its being the simplest or least arbitrary
|
||
possibility would have been, directly, why it obtained.
|
||
|
||
Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, which may obtain. If reality is
|
||
as full as it could be, is that a coincidence? Does it merely happen to
|
||
be true that, of all the cosmic possibilities, the one that obtains is
|
||
at this extreme? As before, that is conceivable, but this coincidence
|
||
would be too great to be credible. We can reasonably assume that, if
|
||
this possibility obtains, that is because it is maximal, or at this
|
||
extreme. On this Maximalist View, it is a fundamental truth that being
|
||
possible, and part of the fullest way that reality could be, is
|
||
sufficient for being actual. That is the highest law governing reality.
|
||
As before, if such a law governed reality, we could still ask why it
|
||
did. But, in discovering this law, we would have made some progress.
|
||
|
||
Here is another special feature. Perhaps reality is the way it is
|
||
because its fundamental laws are, on some criterion, as mathematically
|
||
beautiful as they could be. That is what some physicists are inclined to
|
||
believe.
|
||
|
||
As these remarks suggest, there is no clear boundary here between
|
||
philosophy and science. If there is such a highest law governing
|
||
reality, this law is of the same kind as those that physicists are
|
||
trying to discover. When we appeal to natural laws to explain some
|
||
features of reality, such as the relations between light, gravity, space
|
||
and time, we are not giving causal explanations, since we are not
|
||
claiming that one part of reality caused another part to be some way.
|
||
What such laws explain, or partly explain, are the deeper facts about
|
||
reality that causal explanations take for granted. In the second half of
|
||
this essay, I shall ask how deep such explanations could go.
|