2018-02-23 18:58:03 +00:00
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---
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created_at: '2016-07-28T16:26:37.000Z'
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title: George Kennan's “Long Telegram” (1946)
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url: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm
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author: maverick_iceman
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points: 51
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story_text:
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comment_text:
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num_comments: 30
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story_id:
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story_title:
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story_url:
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parent_id:
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created_at_i: 1469723197
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_tags:
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- story
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- author_maverick_iceman
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- story_12181249
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objectID: '12181249'
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2018-06-08 12:05:27 +00:00
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year: 1946
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2018-02-23 18:58:03 +00:00
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---
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2018-03-03 09:35:28 +00:00
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861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
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2018-02-23 18:19:40 +00:00
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2018-03-03 09:35:28 +00:00
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**
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2018-02-23 18:19:40 +00:00
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2018-03-03 09:35:28 +00:00
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The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
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2018-02-23 18:19:40 +00:00
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2018-03-03 09:35:28 +00:00
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SECRET
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Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. \[Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.\]
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511\. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 \[13\] involves questions so
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intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so
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important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot
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compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I
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feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope,
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therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question
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five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:
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(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
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(2) Background of this outlook
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(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.
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(4) Its projection on unofficial level.
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(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.
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I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but
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questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view
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of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at
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all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows
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**
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Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by
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Official Propaganda Machine
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Are as Follows:
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(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with
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which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As
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stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:
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"In course of further development of international revolution there will
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emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to
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itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist
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center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism.
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Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will
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decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."
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**
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(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in
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nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of
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peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.
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(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus
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generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two
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capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world.
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Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of
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capitalism, incline toward latter.
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(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who
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undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism
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and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.
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(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with
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danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for
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advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily
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powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant
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leadership.
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(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In
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addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes
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(1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in
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acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now
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described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose
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reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively"
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favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and
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utilized for Soviet purposes.
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(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most
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dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the
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people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other
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words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than
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out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true
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colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing
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devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.
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So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of
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Soviet policy? To following:
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(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as
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factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be
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missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as
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individually, of capitalist powers.
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(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be
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directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts
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between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an
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"imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals
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within the various capitalist countries.
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(c) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to
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maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines
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agreeable to Soviet interests.
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(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and
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social-democratic leaders abroad.
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**
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Part 2: Background of Outlook
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Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are
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certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.
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First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter
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are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of
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it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of
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possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their
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own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda
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machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often
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remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But
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party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up
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apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is
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exclusively with these that we have to deal.
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Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are
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for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and
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mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is
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entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no
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longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of
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production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and
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industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by
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socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of
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capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are
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attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention
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against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after
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example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces
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of intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite
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capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane
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person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in
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Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to
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improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia,
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they have been given chance to show what they could do.
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Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was
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amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences
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did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist
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countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve
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their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of
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imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found
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itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an
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avowed community of aim.
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Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are
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being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It
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indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis
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of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do
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with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic
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inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist
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today.
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At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and
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instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity
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of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain
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in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia
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came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more
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competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area.
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But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather
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Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably
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sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and
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artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison
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or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason
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they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact
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between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if
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Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned
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truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in
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patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never
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in compacts and compromises with it.
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It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively
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for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first
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time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly
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neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either
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internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic
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conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment
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of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and
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intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense
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of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian
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rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of
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purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside
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world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule,
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for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt
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bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single
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ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense
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with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability.
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Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of
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that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have
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relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in
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order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes.
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This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings
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of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in
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Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven \[by?\] necessities of
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their own past and present position to put forward which \[apparent
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omission\] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing
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within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with
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growing internal convulsions until it is given final *Coup de grace* by
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rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This
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thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police
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power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from
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outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits
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of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive
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urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of
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uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which
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conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new
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guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate
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and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever
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before.
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It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is
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necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it
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forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too
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dependent to question \[apparent omission\] self-hypnotism, and who have
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no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and
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convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who,
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if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased
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information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness
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and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for
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distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are
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infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed,
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their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as
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instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is
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good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy
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within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin
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himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world.
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Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which
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Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place
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their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they
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are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of
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obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot
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influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in
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Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if
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they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.
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**
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Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official
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Level
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We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we
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expect by way of its practical implementation?
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Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is
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conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions
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undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean
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plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does
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not admit responsibility.
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Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic
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policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different
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planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in
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purpose, timing and effect.
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On official plane we must look for following:
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(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and
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prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum
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development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders;
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continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal
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weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.
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(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made
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to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these
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efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here
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as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran,
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Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come
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into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to
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new areas. Thus a "friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant
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Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist
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control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated.
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But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial
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preparation is complete.
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(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations
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where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or
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diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a
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permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims
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of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be
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favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this
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purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to
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conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for
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power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these
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aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This
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would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split
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unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as
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a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international
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weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward
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UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree
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of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in
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UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that
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organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has
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no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization
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will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.
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(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet
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policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of
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power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory
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that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a
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vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure
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for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my
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opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion
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of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel
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for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this
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Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship
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arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission
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everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus
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acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.
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(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation
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in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong
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possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to
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such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern
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countries, etc.
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(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be
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dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated
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adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy.
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As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet
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Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on
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subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be
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forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip
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service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up
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international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it
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possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own
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security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold
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official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic
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collaboration among nations.
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(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be
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rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples,
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but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could
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weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of
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Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of
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closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of
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vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.
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(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be
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called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great
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stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives
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and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good
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manners.
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**
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Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of
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Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean
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Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no
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Responsibility
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Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are
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following:
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1\. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While
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many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in
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unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely
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together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a
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concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is
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important to remember that this inner core is actually working on
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underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is
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associated.
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2\. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn
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between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has
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become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist
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Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often
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inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the
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conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and
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ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into
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confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide
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internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their
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respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection
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with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are
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numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a
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rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case
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may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools
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of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes
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through \[apparent omission\] organizations, rather than by direct
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action as a separate political party.
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3\. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be
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dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor
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unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies,
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religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal
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magazines, publishing houses, etc.
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4\. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated
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through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and
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women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital
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importance is attached in this connection to international labor
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movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western
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governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable
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of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests
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in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR
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5\. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it
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the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.
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6\. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian,
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Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.
|
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7\. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet
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|
purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and
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|
Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not
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|
only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be
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|
placed extensively at disposal of USSR
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It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will
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|
be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:
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(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major
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|
western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt
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|
national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to
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|
increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of
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|
disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will
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|
be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in
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|
defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society.
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|
Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against
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|
old, newcomers against established residents, etc.
|
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(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to
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|
weaken power and influence of Western Powers of \[on\] colonial
|
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|
|
backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred.
|
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|
Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be
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|
mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries
|
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|
|
will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among
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|
|
dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being
|
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|
|
encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated
|
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|
|
puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over
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|
domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is
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|
achieved.
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(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes
|
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|
pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen
|
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|
|
where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey,
|
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|
|
Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist
|
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|
penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly,
|
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|
|
like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements
|
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|
which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of
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|
these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition
|
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|
becomes particularly shrill and savage. \[)\]
|
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|
(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward
|
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|
|
destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political
|
|
|
|
or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought
|
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|
|
into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are
|
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|
|
financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners,
|
|
|
|
successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership
|
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|
|
or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political
|
|
|
|
figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local
|
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|
|
officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to
|
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|
|
prevent their taking root.
|
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|
(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against
|
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|
|
each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans,
|
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|
|
anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will
|
|
|
|
be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they
|
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|
|
will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to
|
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|
|
discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of
|
|
|
|
unity or cohesion among other \[apparent omission\] from which Russia
|
|
|
|
might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not
|
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|
|
amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the
|
|
|
|
Catholic \[apparent omission\] international economic concerns, or the
|
|
|
|
international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find
|
|
|
|
themselves under fire from many, and often \[apparent omission\].
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane
|
|
|
|
will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down
|
|
|
|
sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line
|
|
|
|
with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival
|
|
|
|
power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is
|
|
|
|
doming But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure
|
|
|
|
for penetration and command of key positions in administration and
|
|
|
|
especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime
|
|
|
|
is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of
|
|
|
|
Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of
|
|
|
|
police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet
|
|
|
|
motives.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Part 5: \[Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy\]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the
|
|
|
|
belief that with US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi* that it is
|
|
|
|
desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be
|
|
|
|
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international
|
|
|
|
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This
|
|
|
|
political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one
|
|
|
|
of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national
|
|
|
|
territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian
|
|
|
|
nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus
|
|
|
|
for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of
|
|
|
|
amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience
|
|
|
|
and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in
|
|
|
|
history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of
|
|
|
|
reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact
|
|
|
|
about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which
|
|
|
|
outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from
|
|
|
|
which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to
|
|
|
|
bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a
|
|
|
|
pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in \[is\]
|
|
|
|
undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably
|
|
|
|
greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from
|
|
|
|
which our political general staff work at present juncture should
|
|
|
|
proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as
|
|
|
|
solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no
|
|
|
|
smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all
|
|
|
|
answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is
|
|
|
|
within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general
|
|
|
|
military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain
|
|
|
|
observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic
|
|
|
|
nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take
|
|
|
|
unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly
|
|
|
|
sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and
|
|
|
|
usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus,
|
|
|
|
if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to
|
|
|
|
use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there
|
|
|
|
need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far
|
|
|
|
the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of
|
|
|
|
cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is
|
|
|
|
factor which it is within our power to influence.
|
|
|
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|
|
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet
|
|
|
|
finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive
|
|
|
|
supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or
|
|
|
|
group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects
|
|
|
|
wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement
|
|
|
|
will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal
|
|
|
|
system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial
|
|
|
|
expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax
|
|
|
|
on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil
|
|
|
|
war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from
|
|
|
|
doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has
|
|
|
|
now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of
|
|
|
|
dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of
|
|
|
|
emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of
|
|
|
|
movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically
|
|
|
|
negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to
|
|
|
|
combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart
|
|
|
|
problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be
|
|
|
|
made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is,
|
|
|
|
the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it
|
|
|
|
with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not
|
|
|
|
to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies
|
|
|
|
unruly and unreasonable individual.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian
|
|
|
|
situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do
|
|
|
|
this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily
|
|
|
|
more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In
|
|
|
|
this we need not be deterred by \[ugliness?\] of picture. I am convinced
|
|
|
|
that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country
|
|
|
|
today if realities of this situation were better understood by our
|
|
|
|
people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown.
|
|
|
|
It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our
|
|
|
|
difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American
|
|
|
|
relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is
|
|
|
|
one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I
|
|
|
|
cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even
|
|
|
|
coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for
|
|
|
|
Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to
|
|
|
|
guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few
|
|
|
|
cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope
|
|
|
|
rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of
|
|
|
|
realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings
|
|
|
|
with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism
|
|
|
|
is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is
|
|
|
|
point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and
|
|
|
|
incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to
|
|
|
|
improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our
|
|
|
|
own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand
|
|
|
|
diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism
|
|
|
|
and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will
|
|
|
|
profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more
|
|
|
|
positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see
|
|
|
|
than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to
|
|
|
|
develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in
|
|
|
|
Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and
|
|
|
|
are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are
|
|
|
|
seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able
|
|
|
|
than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly
|
|
|
|
will.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own
|
|
|
|
methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger
|
|
|
|
that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is
|
|
|
|
that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are
|
|
|
|
coping.
|
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|
KENNAN
|
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800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram
|